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Bounded Cosmopolitanism and a Constitutional Common 
Law 
Se-shauna Wheatle 
Durham University 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Law is now viewed in increasingly transnational terms, in the sense that legal norms and 
institutions extend beyond national boundaries. Thus, the way we conceive of applicable law 
and subjects of the law have grown to reflect a transnational orientation. Yet, there remains 
deep uncertainty regarding the growing transnational nature and scope of law. This 
uncertainty is in part answered by, but also fuelled by, current cosmopolitan theories. Such 
theories -including Jeremy Waldron’s conception of a ‘ius gentium’1 as a body of principles 
shared by the legal world, and Neil Walker’s articulation of ‘global law’2- are decidedly 
cosmopolitan in nature by articulating legal orders and systems that see the individual as part 
of a shared human community.
3
 While these theories make valuable contributions to legal 
studies, they have overreached by asserting an extensive level of transnational consensus, 
consensus which is not fully represented in current transnational dialogue. What is needed is 
a framework that balances the cosmopolitan impulse with awareness of the current 
experience of transnational law, and the historical and cultural limitations on transnational 
dialogue. With this contextual background in mind, I propose the idea of ‘bounded 
cosmopolitanism’, which harnesses the power of cosmopolitanism but restrains the 
cosmopolitan impulse through awareness of the interplay between convergence and 
divergence that is central to the experience of transnational law. As an instance of bounded 
cosmopolitanism, the article advances a cosmopolitan common law constitution, which 
                                                 
1
  Waldron, J (2012) Partly Laws Common to All Mankind Yale University Press.  
2
    See Walker, N (2014) Intimations of Global Law Cambridge University Press; Goodwin, M (2012) ‘What I 
talk about when I talk about Global Law’ (17) Tilburg Law Review 269; Domingo, R (2010) The New 
Global Law Cambridge University Press.  
3
    Cosmopolitanism is used in this article to express the core idea of a shared community among all humanity, 
regardless of national social or political affiliation. See Anderson-Gold, S (2001) Cosmopolitanism and 
Human Rights University of Wales Press at 1-13; Kleingeld, P and Brown, E (2014) ‘Cosmopolitanism’, in 
Zalta, EN (ed) (2014) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cosmopolitanism/.  
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embodies the convergent influence of common law methods and principles with the divergent 
elements of specific constitutional design in individual common law jurisdictions.  
 In Part Two of this article, I briefly assess the impact of transnational interactions on 
legal discourse, explaining the need for a normative underpinning for the myriad 
communications and transactions engaged in across national boundaries. Part Two also 
examines current attempts at constructing and defending a cosmopolitan view of law- with a 
special focus on Jeremy Waldron’s ius gentium theory and Neil Walker’s conceptualisation 
of global law. I maintain that while these attempts have been meaningful contributions to the 
field of transnational law, particularly by revealing the cosmopolitan direction of law, their 
scope is overbroad. Part Three advances a proposal that seeks to avoid such overreach by 
articulating an approach that is founded on a rationale of ‘bounded cosmopolitanism’. As one 
instance showing the potential for bounded cosmopolitanism, Part Four argues that the 
common law operates as a base of cosmopolitan constitutional development. This task is 
undertaken through examination of the nature of the common law, its capacity as a 
constitutional source and its receptivity to external influences. Part Five then offers 
substantive and methodological examples of the cosmopolitan common law constitution in 
operation. The task of illustrating a cosmopolitan common law constitution is deliberately 
approached exclusively by reference to comparative constitutionalism in adjudication; a 
broader analysis involving both comparative and international law would be beyond the 
scope of this article. This analysis of common law norms and methods across a range of 
common law jurisdictions reveals the transnational development and relevance of common 
law and the potential of viewing transnational legal expansion within a model of bounded 
cosmopolitanism.   
THE COSMOPOLITAN IMPULSE AND CURRENT ATTEMPTS AT 
COSMOPOLITAN LAW 
 
Cosmopolitanism conveys the belief that rights and obligations derive not from the nation 
state but from the interests and needs of the individual.
4
 Yet, cosmopolitanism, despite its 
strong unifying ethos, exists alongside instruments of closure; the philosophy emphasizes the 
influence of the bonds that traverse borders but does not necessitate an end to the state, to 
distinct languages, political entities and social institutions. Varying schools of 
                                                 
4
  Glenn, P (2013) A Cosmopolitan State Oxford University Press at 172-73. 
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cosmopolitanism are animated in political and cultural theory, with stronger versions 
demanding a world community in which national borders are irrelevant while weaker 
versions encourage the development of practices that enable co-existence and the 
management of difference.
5
 Among those who seek to temper cosmopolitan impulses is 
Kwame Appiah who advocates ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ which sees individuals as ‘citizens 
of the world’ but rooted in, and showing greater allegiance to their homelands.6 It is this spirit 
of embracing and tempering cosmopolitanism that this article seeks to bring to approaches to 
cosmopolitan law. 
There is a strong impulse towards cosmopolitanism that is reflected in current legal 
theories of transnational law. This impulse is fuelled by a confluence of factors, including the 
scientific desire to describe and account for the observed phenomenon of economic, legal and 
cultural interchanges and acknowledgement of a continuing reality of communications and 
transfer of knowledge, expertise, ideas and norms across national boundaries.
7
 Further, there 
is a perceived need to regulate transnational interactions
8
 and to examine the extent of 
normative commonality underlying the interactions between state institutions (legislatures, 
courts) and social and transnational institutions (corporations, associations, transnational 
legal systems).
9
 Cosmopolitanism, viewed through this lens, partly enables law and legal 
studies to keep pace with reality.  
The impetus for cosmopolitanism is accordingly bound up with globalisation, a term 
that conjures up images of expeditive cross-border communications and harmonisation of 
laws.
10
 Yet, keeping pace with reality also demands that legal scholars embrace the pluralism 
that has accompanied globalisation. Pluralism is a useful indicator of the porosity of legal 
boundaries as legal transplantation and migration have resulted in the blending of legal 
traditions. Rather than a transplanted legal norm or legal culture completely dominating the 
local law, there is a more complex dynamic in which a transplanted norm interacts with and 
adapts to the legal and socio-cultural traditions of the locale. So too, ‘the constant interaction 
                                                 
5
  See, eg, Appiah, K (1997) ‘Cosmopolitan Patriots’ (23) Critical Inquiry 617 at 629. 
6
  Ibid at 619-22 cf Nussbaum, M (1996) ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in Cohen, J (ed) (1996) For Love 
of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism Beacon Press. 
7
  Twining, W (2009) Globalisation and Legal Scholarship Wolf Legal Publishers at 20-31. 
8
  Drahos P and Braithwaite, J (2001) ‘The Globalisation of Regulation’ (9) Journal of Political Philosophy 
103 at 106-07. 
9
  Chang, W and Yeh, J (2012) ‘Internationalization of Constitutional Law’ in Ronsenfeld, M and Sajó, A 
(2012) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law Oxford University Press at 1169-71. 
10
  Menski, W (2006) Comparative law in a global context: the legal systems of Asia and Africa Cambridge 
University Press at 3. 
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between the global and the local creates more plurality rather than greater uniformity’.11 
Alongside these trends, the process of globalisation itself is not a single undifferentiated and 
unifocal process. As Glenn puts it, ‘there are multiple globalizations’;12 globalisation is seen 
not only in the fields of technology, business and law, but also in religion, and globalisation 
does not proceed from merely the western regions of the world but also from the east. While 
there is western dominance within those globalisation processes, an accurate assessment of 
the dimensions of such dominance ought to proceed from the full picture of globalisation in 
the world today. Thus, if cosmopolitanism in legal scholarship is to be relevant and useful, it 
must account for the realities of pluralism and diversity as not only existing alongside 
globalisation, but also as features of globalisation.  
Moreover, there is a compelling need for self-awareness in our description and 
analysis of globalised law. Lurking behind the movements towards globalised visions of law 
and legal systems is the concern that current movements represent ‘a remodelled version of 
earlier colonial domination’.13 Legal transplantation from coloniser to colonised, with 
implications of European superiority, were a feature of a colonial period which transnational 
law scholars must reckon with today. This calls for frank discussion of the extent to which 
transplantation has given way to reciprocity and/or dialogue, and whether Eurocentricity is 
being replaced by true globality.
14
 Central to the frank self-awareness required by the 
exercise of cosmopolitanism in law is a determination whether claims of universalism mask 
the proliferation of westernisation and an accurate assessment of the breadth of acceptance of 
claimed universal norms.  
The need for self-awareness and caution in discourse on ‘globalised’ law sits uneasily 
with the themes and features of ius gentium and global law proposals. The ius gentium seeks 
to resurrect and refine ancient ideas of ‘a common law of mankind’, which bore connections 
to both natural law and the Roman Empire’s recognition of laws common and applicable to 
foreigners who did not have the benefit of ordinary Roman law.
15
 Waldron’s reconfiguration 
of the ius gentium situates this theory within the context of comparative law, international 
law and globalisation in the 20th and 21st centuries. He describes the modern ius gentium as 
a system of legal principles common to the legal world. Waldron’s theory helpfully elevates 
                                                 
11
  Ibid at 12. 
12
  Glenn, P (2014) Legal Traditions in the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law Oxford University Press 2014 
at 54. 
13
   Menski supra note 10 at 37. 
14
  Wheatle, S (2015) ‘Comparative Law and the Ius Gentium’ (3) Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1060. 
15
   Waldron, J (2005) ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (119) Harvard Law Review 129 at 132-34. 
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and utilises both the comparative method and- to a lesser extent- international law to identify 
substantive norms. Concurrently, the global law field has received growing attention from 
scholars, giving rise to conferences, symposia and scholarly work, the most recent and 
significant offering of which is Neil Walker’s Intimations of Global Law. Walker’s thesis 
merits close study and particular attention as it seeks to address the most salient and piercing 
critiques of the global law movement. Acknowledging the ‘compromised quality’ of the term 
global law, which partly arises from global law’s presumptions about the advance of 
globalisation and the eclipsing of the state, Walker undertakes a reconceptualistion of global 
law.
16
 The new conception understands global law as law which shares ‘a practical 
endorsement of or commitment to the universal or otherwise global-in-general’ authority of 
some laws.
17
 Global law, so described, is drawn from multiple sources, including national, 
regional, comparative and international law and is not limited by source, but only by the 
potential reach of the law. 
Across both the ius gentium and global law proposals there is a commitment to 
universality or globality. Global law is so identified because of its universal or global 
authority, having either a universal scope ‘in-principle’ or a ‘tangible sense of a law that can 
[…] spread across the globe’.18 Global law then, has ‘no a priori territorial limitation’ and 
purports to cover all actors and activities relevant to its remit across the globe.’19 Universality 
is also an unmistakable theme of the ius gentium. Relying largely on comparative 
constitutional adjudication, Waldron describes the ius gentium as ‘laws common to all 
mankind’, comprised of universal principles observed in the legal world.20 Despite Waldron’s 
claims of the modesty of his theory, it makes a rather bold claim of the existence of the ius 
gentium as a legal system. Yet, transnational legal discourse occurs largely within networks 
often defined by common languages or legal heritage.
21
 Waldron’s response is to maintain 
that the ius gentium is currently in existence despite that it develops unevenly, ‘in fits and 
starts’.22 Yet, even accepting an uneven development, the existence of a system applicable to 
the entire legal world is undermined by the fact that transnational legal exchanges tend to 
                                                 
16
   Walker, Intimations supra note 2 at 3-11. 
17
   Walker, Intimations supra note 2 at 18. 
18
   Walker, Intimations supra note 2 at 23. 
19
  Walker, Intimations supra note 2 at 21. 
20
   Waldron, Partly Laws supra note 1 at 3 and 68. 
21
  Law, D & Versteeg, M (2011) ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (99) California Law 
Review1163. A common language is an important connector; though some English-speaking states (such as 
South Africa and the United States of America) have a distinct civil law influence, the common language 
fosters continued communication with other Anglophone jurisdictions. 
22
   Waldron, Partly Laws supra note 1 at 208. 
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occur within networks; the disparate and uneven development of such exchanges means that 
the ius gentium cannot possess all the elements- particularly the cohesion- of a legal system.
23
 
The notion of doctrinal systematicity across the legal world, rather than within closely 
interrelated and highly communicative systems, requires more detailed treatment than has 
thus far been afforded.
24
 Moreover, as Fredman notes: ‘Even within international law, it has 
become increasingly difficult to find a cohesive set of central principles. How much more so 
for comparative law?’25 
Walker seeks to avoid similar difficulties by describing ‘intimations’ of global law, 
rather than a fully established system and by expressing multiple qualifications and mutually 
existing definitions for global law. Thus, as intimations, Walker conceives of global law as 
more aspirational- ‘in the process of becoming’- rather than settled law. Moreover, global law 
as conceived by Walker can be ascribed ‘global’ on account of either the source of the law, 
the applicability of the law or even the mere belief in the global potential of (the) law.
26
 
Under the banner of this definition, a law can be ‘global’ on account of its source (such as the 
United Nations), on account of its effect or merely on the basis that the law represents an 
‘endorsement’ of the prospect that it could spread across the globe.27 By so qualifying his 
claims, Walker sidesteps what would be a vulnerable requirement that global law be globally 
applicable, a characteristic which would mirror one of the flaws with Waldron’s theory. Yet, 
the multiple qualifications and definitions ultimately undermine the use value of global law. 
They limit the ability to pin down the actual meaning of global law and the identification of 
specific norms that would qualify as global beyond ius cogens and erga omnes norms, which 
are cited by Walker as examples of norms with global effect. Moreover, the varying 
definitions expose underlying doubt and insecurity about the true meaning and even existence 
of global law. In sum, while engaging with the cosmopolitan direction of law, the coverage 
claimed by both ius gentium and global law proposals extends beyond the conceptual or 
empirical support presented. 
Constitutionalism also figures significantly in both Walker’s and Waldron’s theories. 
Waldron’s analysis relies heavily on constitutional and human rights issues and decisions; he 
characterises the ius gentium as a body of laws that is particularly applicable to relations 
                                                 
23
   Waldron, Partly Laws supra note 1 at 200; Wheatle supra note 14 at 1060 and 1076-77. 
24
   Waldron, Partly Laws supra note 1 at 67-70. 
25
   Fredman, S (2015) ‘Foreign fads or fashions? The role of comparativism in human rights law’ (64) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 631 at 640. 
26
   Walker, Intimations supra note 2. 
27
   Walker, Intimations supra note 2 at 20-24. 
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between individuals and the government.
28
 Indeed, decisions and transnational conversations 
relating to the death penalty, equality and freedom of expression are dominant in Waldron’s 
defence of the ius gentium. Meanwhile, Walker’s work identifies in global law an approach 
that involves basic principles and normative templates that condition and constrain the legal 
order.
29
 Walker classifies human rights - whether derived from international, regional or 
national sites - as part of those core normative claims.
30
 Both theories seem to acknowledge–
correctly, in my view- that a constitutional framework is an essential underpinning for any 
articulation of a model for a normative order, providing as it does the structural and 
constitutive guides and restraints for the multiple norms and institutions of that legal order. It 
is constitutional norms that provide the requisite coherence for the interrelation between 
varied norms of the order and their logical development over time. Yet, the constitutional 
elements of both theories ultimately rest on an overbroad vision of law in the world.        
BOUNDED COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
In response to the cosmopolitan impulse as well as the contributions and shortcomings of 
current theories, the challenge is to develop an approach that combines a ‘globality 
conscious’ and ‘plurality-sensitive’ view of the law and transnational legal 
communications.
31
 The bounded cosmopolitanism approach seeks to answer this call; it rests 
within a cosmopolitan framework through acknowledgment of interactions and 
communications beyond the state and a modern view of legal development that transcends 
traditional boundaries. Accepting the continuation of normative differentiation and 
compartmentalised relationships, bounded cosmopolitanism recognises and demarcates 
shared spaces for the management of normative conflict.  
Awareness and meaningful recognition of compartmentalisation in transnational 
exchanges is a crucial part of developing an accurate picture of transnational 
constitutionalism in the world today. Compartmentalisation occurs as a result of variance of 
political and legal culture, and networks defined by history, experience and language. 
Consequently, there is ample empirical data testifying to the tendency of references to foreign 
                                                 
28
   Waldron, Partly Laws supra note 1 at 28. 
29
   Walker, Intimations supra note 2 at 70. Constitutionalism is central to what Walker describes as ‘convergent 
approaches’ to global law: Walker Intimations supra note 2 at 58-106. 
30
   Walker Intimations supra note 2 at 72. 
31
  The terms ‘globality-conscious’ and ‘plurality-sensitive’ are borrowed from Menski supra note 10 at 81. 
While Menski does not adopt a typology of common law and civil law, he does maintain the need for 
awareness of difference and divides jurisdictions into categories such as Hindu law and African law. 
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law to be dominated by jurisdictions that share a legal tradition.
32
 Further, experiential 
connections and cultural similarities prove significant, and partly account for the tendency of 
developed countries to cite each other.
33
 This compartmentalisation affects legal 
communications and legal doctrine and must be accounted for in formulating models of 
cosmopolitanism. Thus, there are transnational legal orders developing within networks but 
without the density and cohesion of national constitutional systems.
34
  
Compartmentalisation bears similarities with the idea of fragmentation popularised by 
Gunther Teubner.
35
 The fragmentation metaphor utilised by Teubner helps to frame both the 
problem of and the solution to, a cosmopolitanism that argues for a ‘unitary global 
constitution’. The compartmentalisation metaphor used in this article serves a similar purpose 
by explaining the need to reject a unitary cosmopolitan legal framework and pointing the way 
forward for a cosmopolitanism that is transnational but not unitary. Yet, fragmentation and 
compartmentalisation have different starting points and rest on different assumptions. The 
metaphor of fragmentation is top down and assumes the existence of a larger normative order 
that has been or is being disintegrated. Compartmentalisation, on the other hand, approaches 
the growth of cosmopolitanism using a bottom up approach that sees emerging consensus 
developing from transnational conversations between legal actors within networks.  
Within this theoretical framework, emerging examples can be found of the existence 
of bounded cosmopolitanism. Some of these instances exist as regional networks whereas 
others are apparent in tradition-based connections. The European Union, for instance, has 
given rise to a cosmopolitan order in the form of the much debated emergence of EU 
constitutionalism.
36
 The countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean would also demonstrate 
bounded cosmopolitanism, reflecting a combination of common law, national constitutions 
and related judgments from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Caribbean 
                                                 
32
  Law and Versteeg Intimations supra note 2; Saunders, C and Stone, A (2013) ‘Reference to Foreign 
Precedents by the Australian High Court: A Matter of Method’ in Groppi, T & Ponthoreau, M (eds) (2013) 
The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges Hart Publishing. 
33
  See Groppi, T and Ponthoreau, M (2013) ‘Conclusion’ in Groppi and Ponthoreau supra note 32 at 418-19. 
34
  See Teubner, G (2012) Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization Oxford 
University Press at 8. 
35
  On constitutional fragmentation, see ibid; del Moral, I (2010) ‘At King Agramant’s camp: Old debates, new 
constitutional times’ (8) International Journal of Constitutional Law 580. 
36
  Walker, N (2009) 'Reframing EU Constitutionalism' in Dunoff, J and Trachtman, J (eds) (2009) Ruling the 
World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance Cambridge University Press 2009 at 
149; Stone Sweet, A (2012) ‘A cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in 
Europe’ (1) Global Constitutionalism 53.   
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Court of Justice.
37
 The cosmopolitan common law constitution provides one model for the 
operation of bounded cosmopolitanism. It reflects cosmopolitanism’s unifying ethos by 
encompassing constitutional norms and methods that have gained consensus in common law 
jurisdictions. While not displacing the codified constitutions which exist in most common 
law states, the common law constitution provides a bedrock of broadly applicable tools that 
exist alongside those codified constitutions. The cosmopolitan common law constitution is 
representative of the central features of bounded cosmopolitanism, as it rests on the common 
bonds of common law norms and methods as well as divergent factors such as varying 
constitutional and institutional contexts.  
The argument supporting the existence of a cosmopolitan common law constitution is 
both descriptive and normative. The normative elements exist in my view that an examination 
of both the nature of a constitution and the nature of the common law reveal the common 
law’s capacity for transnational constitutional relevance. The normative argument is 
supplemented by observation of the ways in which common law principles and methods are 
currently being developed and employed across jurisdictions. Yet, this proposal is more 
modest than current attempts at globalised legal systems, in its geographical scope as well as 
in its systemic claims. Geographically, it is limited by the reach of the common law, being 
only applicable in and among common law networks. Systematically, there is no attempt to 
prove that a cosmopolitan common law constitution is a current system of law. This proposal 
adopts Waldron’s helpful method of discerning consensus across jurisdictions, but maintains 
that such consensus, rather than being global, is limited by networks, and rather than having 
crystallized into a system, remains a developing phenomenon without doctrinal systematicity. 
The argument advanced in this article is that there is an iterative process of transnational 
common law constitutionalism occurring among common law jurisdictions.  
The following section will make the case for the existence of a cosmopolitan common 
law constitution by addressing, first, the constitutional capacity of the common law and 
second, the common law’s cosmopolitan relevance. In doing so, we see the elements of 
bounded cosmopolitanism in the transnational scope and unifying features of the common 
law alongside the divergence and pluralism occasioned by varying national constitutional 
features. 
                                                 
37
  For most Commonwealth Caribbean states, the Privy Council is the final appellate body but Guyana, 
Barbados, Belize and Dominica have replaced the Privy Council’s appellate jurisdiction with the Caribbean 
Court of Justice.  
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THE COMMON LAW’S COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
There are two ideas of ‘common law’ which are activated in this discussion. In the first sense, 
common law is used to denote that source of law that is distinct from statute law and 
developed through judicial decisions. The second sense of the word common law is to 
describe the common law legal tradition – a legal tradition developed in England after the 
Norman Conquest and later spreading across diverse nations through colonialism. At the risk 
of over-simplification, this tradition is typified by characteristics such as a central role for 
judges in developing legal norms, a focus on case law, a doctrine of precedent and an 
uncodified legal system, which, while including statutes, lacks comprehensive legal codes.
38
 
Undoubtedly, the common law legal system is not a pure, hermetic group, but -like all legal 
systems- experiences levels of mixes and overlaps.
39
 The historical root of the common law 
legal family is now significantly impacted by the European Union through the European 
Communities Act 1972 and by the European Convention on Human Rights through the 
vehicle of the Human Rights Act 1998, but it undoubtedly remains a common law 
jurisdiction. So also, while religious law is a significant facet of Indian law and there were 
attempts at codification in core areas of law, the Indian legal system maintains a common law 
character.
40
 With this understanding of the common law, the concept of a cosmopolitan 
common law constitution applies most definitively to a core of common law countries, 
namely those that are English-speaking, despite having incorporated civil, religious or 
customary concepts, such as Australia, Canada, the Commonwealth Caribbean, Fiji and 
Ghana. In addition, there are countries that reside more on the periphery of the common law – 
such as the United States of America, South Africa and Pakistan – where there are looser (but 
still existing connections) to a cosmopolitan common law constitution. The source-based 
sense of the common law provides the methodological and substantive underpinning for 
developing transnational constitutionalism within a network that is geographically limited 
and defined by the legal-tradition based sense of the common law.  
                                                 
38
  Zweigert, K and Kötz, H (1998) An Introduction to Comparative Law (3
rd
 edn) Clarendon Press; Simpson, 
AWB (2008) ‘Common Law’ in Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds) (2008) New Oxford Companion to 
Law Oxford University Press at 164. 
39
  Örücü, E (2004) ‘Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary Approach’ in Van Hoecke, M 
(ed) (2004) Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law Hart Publishing at 363; Häcker, B (2015) 
‘Divergence and convergence in the common law - lessons from the ius commune’ (131) Law Quarterly 
Review 424 at 438-39. 
40
  De Cruz, P (2006) Comparative Law in a Changing World Cavendish Publishing at 125-26; Siems, M (2014) 
Comparative Law Cambridge University Press at 44.  
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The premise for the cosmopolitan common law constitution lies in both the nature of a 
constitution and the nature of the common law. A constitution is defined by distinctive 
features, central among those being the constitutive, constraining and fundamental qualities 
of a constitution. The constitutive work of a constitution exists in its role in the identification 
of the legal and political structure of the state. The ongoing work of constitutional norms in 
defining the powers and duties of government provides a common point of impact between 
the constitution and administrative organs, as well as between courts and the executive. The 
primacy of constitutional norms over ordinary norms, which form part of what is commonly 
dubbed the ‘ordinary law’ of the state, earns the constitution the title of fundamental law. 
This understanding of the central functions of a constitution consciously omits any 
requirement for a constitution to restrict legislative competence. Such restrictive conceptions 
of a constitution do not possess the analytical value of application to a range of organisational 
models and political systems. Moreover, overly prescriptive and inflexible models of 
constitutionalism that mandate features such as a codified document, comprehensive human 
rights protections or substantive legal restraints on legislative power are of limited use to 
comparatists as they would privilege specific political preferences and particular 
constitutional designs while excluding important constitutional models such as those in the 
United Kingdom or Australia.
41
 There is no doubt that while this conceptualisation of a 
constitution is applicable to a wide cross-section of existing constitutional models, this 
understanding of a constitution- particularly the elevation of constitutional over ordinary 
norms- would be rejected by at least some adherents of political constitutionalism. The 
features outlined here therefore apply to constitutional models in practice despite not 
conforming to either a political or legal constitutionalist ideal.
42
 
The recognition of a constitution as a source of fundamental norms is central to its 
exalted position among laws. Consistent with this feature of a constitution, a modern view of 
the common law sees within it a bedrock of fundamental norms that condition the 
interpretation and operation of other common law rules and exert special influence on the 
workings of the state and the interaction between the individual and the state. Traditional 
ideas of the common law as a flat terrain of coterminous rules are no longer- if they ever 
                                                 
41
  Feldman, D (2011) ‘Which in Your Case You Have Not Got’: Constitutionalism at Home and Abroad’ (64) 
Current Legal Problems 117 at 120-21. 
42
  Indeed, the political constitutionalist ideal has been defeated as a practical matter and the trend in common 
law jurisdictions is towards a combination of political and legal constitutionalism. See Gardbaum, S (2013) 
The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism Cambridge University Press at 21-38. 
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were- convincing.
43
 The articulation of common law rights- particularly in a series of British 
cases in the late 1990s- and the ‘recent resurgence of the common law as a source of rights 
protection’, are indicative of the constitutional import of select common law norms.44 Even 
beyond the sphere of rights properly so called, common law constitutional principles relating 
to the organization of the state are making their mark on constitutional development. Superior 
courts in countries such as Australia, Jamaica and the UK have spoken to fundamental 
common law constitutional principles such as the rule of law and their role in interpreting 
ordinary statues and constitutional instruments and in conditioning the relationship between 
institutions of state.
45
 Thus, in a UK Supreme Court judgment in HS2, Lords Neuberger and 
Mance asserted the existence of ‘fundamental principles, whether contained in other 
constitutional instruments or recognised at common law’ and made the significant doctrinal 
clarification that such constitutional principles could potentially prevail over European Union 
norms applied through the European Communities Act 1972, in the event of a conflict.
46
 
There is therefore a presence of norms that, while not in all jurisdictions (certainly not in the 
United Kingdom), possessing the capacity to trump legislation, nonetheless shape the 
meaning of legislation through judicial interpretation and the implementation of 
governmental policy through judicial review. In their general influence over the interpretation 
and application of other norms, constitutional norms at common law operate as fundamental 
rules and principles. 
Secondly, restraints on governmental power are partly animated by the common law. 
Through a combination of substantive doctrines and interpretative principles, the common 
law is active in prescribing limits on the exercise of governmental power. These limits are 
often mediated through the rule of law operating either as an independent constitutional 
principle, as a guide to interpretation of constitutional text or as a source for more specific 
rules of administrative law. Consequently, the rule of law has been invoked to require 
government officials to publish guidance for the exercise of discretion,
47
 to bar a government 
from executing a convicted prisoner prior to the exhaustion of applications before regional 
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human rights bodies
48
 and to prevent an Attorney General from overriding the decision of a 
tribunal.
49
  
Finally, the constitutive role played by the common law is admittedly more subtle 
than its constraining and fundamental roles. Yet, there is in new and changing constitutions 
an acknowledgement that the common law supplies ‘unstated assumptions’ that help to frame 
and develop the governing structure of the state. Traditionally accepted common law 
principles thus guided the design and certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 and the architecture of the judiciary in the nations of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.
50
 In the pivotal Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa by 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the formation of a new judiciary and the roles of 
Parliament and the executive in the appointment and removal of judges were measured 
against judicial independence and the separation of powers.
51
 The separation of powers 
figured significantly in early cases on the interpretation of post-colonial constitutions of the 
mid to late twentieth century, most notably in not only constituting the judicial power 
separately from the legislative and executive branches, but also in preventing the usurpation 
or absorption of the judicial power by the legislature.
52
 That such doctrines and principles are 
influential in creating the institutional structure of new or renewed states in Africa, Asia and 
the Caribbean is a testament to the relevance of the common law as a constitutional source 
across temporal and geographical boundaries. 
Beyond this basic understanding of the main functions of a constitution, it is the 
nature of a constitution that permits us to perform a more abstract assessment of the potential 
for common law to perform as a constitution, divorced from an assessment of whether 
particular norms of the common law speak to the identification of the powers and limitations 
of the political structure of the state. The law of the constitution is ‘an organic work-in-
progress whose lifeblood is the continuity of change’.53 The nature of a constitution is to 
embody and facilitate an interaction between that change and stability. Accordingly, the 
interplay of endurance, history and evolution are indispensable elements of the nature of a 
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constitution, as explained by Raz,
54
 who sees a constitution ‘as a stable framework for the 
political and legal institutions of the country, to be adjusted and amended from time to time, 
but basically to preserve stability and continuity in the legal and political structure, and the 
basic principles that guide its institutions.’55 
Evolution and Stability 
The common law presents a natural source for a constitution, combining as it does respect for 
the past, a proven capacity for endurance and an element of evolutionary growth. Indeed, 
constitutional adjudication and common law adjudication share a method of legal analysis: 
‘utilizing the past to resolve present problems in a way that helps to clarify the future.’56 The 
common law’s respect for history is most practically expressed in the role of precedent, 
which facilitates an iterative process of development of the law. Hence, the very existence of 
a common law rule depends on a convincing account of prior decisions. More fundamentally 
however, a look beneath the surface reveals the bedrock of the past in fundamental doctrines 
that are still utilized in common law courts. For instance, reliance upon rationality stands as a 
mainstay and building block of public law in the common law world. In fact, the doctrine of 
stare decisis itself beckons to rationality by appealing to the maxim that like cases should be 
treated alike.
57
  
 Yet the common law’s regard for history does not devolve into blind veneration; it 
accommodates the evolution that is both a noted characteristic of the common law method 
and an essential requirement for the continuing relevance of any constitutional arrangement. 
Historical regard is balanced with an evolutionary nature that ensures its continued relevance 
and endurance. The steady evolution of the common law is largely fostered by its 
responsiveness to reason, changing social conditions and evolving conceptions of public good 
and public values. A classic example is the gradual judicial restriction of the spousal 
exception to rape, culminating in its abolition in R v R in 1992
58
 but we can also add to this 
list the gradual development of the right of access to court at common law, which continues 
to exist as an autonomous common law right, while being influenced by written constitutions 
(as in Australia) or bills of rights (as with the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)). There has long 
been judicial recognition of the need for the individual to have access to independent judicial 
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pronouncement on, and protection of, their private rights and interests. Thus, in a 1915 case 
(In re Boaler), it was said that: ‘One of the valuable rights of every subject of the King is to 
appeal to the King in his Courts if he alleges that a civil wrong has been done to him, or if he 
alleges that a wrong punishable criminally has been done to him, or has been committed by 
another subject of the King.’59 But momentous decisions of the UK High Court in ex p. 
Witham and of the Supreme Court of Canada in Trial Lawyers Assn. of British Columbia v 
British Columbia modernised this right by applying it to the levy of court fees and taking 
account of the impact of economic hardships on access to courts.
60
 This constitutional right is 
now also of relevance to counter-terrorism measures such as asset freezing orders
61
 and 
immigration and refugee policy.
62
  
The constitutional capacity of the common law has itself been an evolutive exercise, 
which has been vividly revealed in recent decisions in which judges have articulated both the 
substantive constitutional content of the common law and the methodology by which 
common law can enforce constitutional rights and constitutional principles. In confirming 
that constitutional status is recognised in domestic norms of constitutional importance, the 
HS2 judgment also confirmed the existence of a tiered domestic legal order in the 
jurisdictional home of the common law. Further, ‘fundamental principles […] recognised at 
common law’ were included within the assemblage of domestic constitutional norms.63 
Significant recent evidence of the constitutionalisation of the common law is found in 
the decision of UK Supreme Court in Evans v Attorney General and the Privy Council’s 
judgment in Hunte v The State on an appeal from Trinidad and Tobago; both judgments 
invoked the rule of law to delineate the review jurisdiction of the court.
64
 Evans concerned a 
claim by a journalist under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) for public access to 
communications between the Prince of Wales and ministers of government.
65
 The FOI 
request had been rejected by the relevant government departments, a rejection which was 
then upheld by the Information Commissioner. The catalyst arose when the Upper Tribunal 
decided that the letters should be disclosed, in response to which the Attorney General issued 
a Certificate under section 53 of the FOIA, stating that on reasonable grounds, he had 
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concluded that the government departments had been entitled to refuse disclosure of the 
letters. The issue of the certificate was the subject of judicial review proceedings which were 
eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. In arriving at the conclusion that the Certificate 
was invalid and should be quashed, the President of the Supreme Court issued a plurality 
judgment which framed the issue in terms of the common law constitution.  
The judgment identified two constitutional principles which were described as 
‘fundamental components of the rule of law’ and were viewed as applicable beyond the 
boundaries of the UK: first, that decisions of a court are binding and cannot be ignored or set 
aside and second, that executive decisions and actions are, subject to exceptions, reviewable 
by the court.
66
 Lord Neuberger thereby identified both an objective state-centred component 
of the rule of law protecting the finality of court decisions under the constitution and a 
subjective individual-centred component, which speaks to the protection of individual rights.  
The Privy Council also appealed to the rule of law in Hunte, in this case to determine 
the circumstances in which the Board should depart from previous decisions. The issue raised 
in the case was the jurisdiction of the Privy Council to commute a sentence on constitutional 
grounds when hearing an appeal from a criminal trial. The Privy Council had held as recently 
as 2014 that it did have such jurisdiction,
67
 but on fuller consideration of the issue in Hunte, 
the majority concluded that the Privy Council had no such jurisdiction in a criminal appeal 
and that a constitutional challenge to the sentence would have to be mounted by a 
constitutional motion. Having so concluded, the Board then considered whether to depart 
from its previous decision in Ramdeen, and in so doing ‘depart from the strong presumption 
in favour of respecting precedent.’ Both the majority judgment issued by Lord Toulson and 
the concurring judgment delivered by Lord Neuberger used the rule of law to resolve this 
question.
68
 In deciding that the Privy Council must depart from its 2014 decision, Lord 
Toulson reasoned that: ‘If the Board is persuaded that it has taken to itself a judicial power 
which it does not possess, it would be damaging to respect for the rule of law to continue to 
exercise a purported judicial power contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.’69 The 
common law - through appeal to the rule of law - has therefore been of constitutional service 
in determining the constitutional scope of judicial power. 
The common law’s constitutional relevance is increasingly evident in judicial decisions 
that seek to resolve questions of jurisdiction and tensions between traditional and 
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contemporary norms. Moreover, in arriving at these resolutions, longstanding common law 
ideas and norms have been expanded, elevated and repurposed. In this sense, the evolution of 
the common law is married with the evolution of the constitution. 
Catholicity and Receptivity 
The case for common law as a source for a cosmopolitan constitution rests partly on a 
conceptualisation of the common law constitution as catholic in its development and 
application. Both cosmopolitan theory and comparative studies reveal that at a fundamental 
level, a constitution is not- and cannot be- an exercise in exclusivity. There are philosophical, 
institutional and experiential bonds that necessarily influence the development of a 
constitution. There is ample comparative evidence of the transnational capacity of the 
common law; constitutional case law in the common law world demonstrates transnational 
judicial dialogue in developing common law constitutional norms.
70
  
At a fundamental level, the broad applicability and receptivity of the common law 
make it well suited to perform the transnational task demanded of a cosmopolitan 
constitution.
71
 Sir John Laws has described catholicity as one of the virtues of the common 
law, noting that ‘the common law draws inspiration from many sources’ and ‘has been 
greatly enriched from […] implants’, including implants from Europe through the European 
Union and the European Convention on Human Rights.
72
 There is much comparative 
evidence of the transnational capacity of the common law that can be gleaned from case law 
demonstrating transnational judicial dialogue in developing constitutional norms of the 
common law.
73
 Thus, the doctrines of proportionality and legitimate expectations continue to 
transform public law in common law countries, despite having ‘a distinctly European 
pedigree.’74 Along with influential judgments of European regional courts, stand authoritative 
pronouncements from the Supreme Court of Canada elucidating the proportionality test.
75
 
Canada’s Oakes test has been approvingly cited or followed by the Privy Council, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the UK Supreme Court and the New Zealand Court of 
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Appeal.
76
 The doctrine of legitimate expectations similarly reflects an influence from outside 
the common law world, as it is believed to have European origins.
77
 Its common law form has 
been enriched by an interaction of judgments from Australia, the Commonwealth Caribbean 
and the United Kingdom. Two areas at the vanguard of legitimate expectations- the doctrine’s 
use in facilitating the observance of unincorporated treaties and the development of 
substantive legitimate expectations- have been aided by references to transnational 
conversations. Filtering unincorporated treaties through legitimate expectations has grown 
through judicial decisions of the Privy Council and the Caribbean Court of Justice in death 
penalty cases from the Commonwealth Caribbean.
78
 These developments are exemplified in 
the decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice in Attorney General v Joseph and Boyce – 
following analysis of case law from a wide range of common law jurisdictions- that an 
individual convicted of murder and sentenced to death can derive substantive legitimate 
expectations from the ratification of a treaty.
79
 The legacy of landmark cases on the domestic 
implications of unincorporated treaties was recently noted by Lord Kerr in concluding that 
the unincorporated UN Convention on the Rights of the Child should be directly enforceable 
in the UK.
80
 Such ‘cross-pollination’ between jurisdictions encourages the 
constitutionalisation of the common law while demonstrating the common law’s transnational 
scope. 
Ugly Truths and Growing Pains 
While justifiably lauding the constitutional and transnational facility of the common law, the 
same self-awareness that is brought to bear on claims of globalised law must also be observed 
in our assessment of the common law’s capacity for transnational constitutionalism in the 21st 
century. This self-awareness demands frank acknowledgement of the historical successes and 
failures of the common law in establishing a broad base of constitutional norms. Such 
acknowledgment responds to the familiar critique by sceptics that common law 
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constitutionalists ‘rely on an idealised conception of the common law’.81 Certainly, there was 
a historical tendency of the common law to privilege freedom of contract, private property 
rights and traditional conceptions of rational public decision-making over broader claims to 
the protection of public values in promoting equal opportunity. Thus, it has been said that 
‘the common law recognizes the rights of private parties to do what they please with their 
property. Such a right necessarily guarantees the right to exclude’.82 Such traditional rights 
and freedoms were jealously protected in the face of challenges based on ideas of equality 
and non-discrimination.  
One need only reflect on a few notorious (or at the very least controversial) decisions 
to appreciate the flaws in the common law’s historical approach to some matters of 
constitutional significance.
83
 While Somerset’s Case has been invoked as proof of the 
common law’s rejection of slavery,84 the narrow scope of Lord Mansfield’s celebrated 
judgment is laid bare in subsequent decisions. Accordingly, the Grace Jones case affirmed 
that though a slave could not be coerced in England, once she returned to the colonies, she 
had no claim to freedom.
85
 That decision was hailed in the Royal Gazette of Jamaica as one 
that ‘stamp[ed] a value and a consistency upon West India property’ and affirmed that ‘the 
Colonists have a right to protect that property’.86 Decades later, in 1859 the Court of 
Common Pleas upheld a contract entered into by a British company for the sale of slaves in 
Brazil.
87
  
More troubling examples exist in the last century. Roberts v Hopwood, for instance, 
has been fairly cited as a symbol of judicial resistance to efforts to remove gender 
discrimination.
88
 The attempt by the Poplar Borough Council to introduce equal pay for men 
and women council employees on their lowest pay grade was invalidated by the House of 
Lords, which took the view that the Council had irrationally ‘allowed themselves to be 
guided in preference by some eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy, or by a feminist 
ambition to secure equality of the sexes in the matter of wages in the world of labour.’89 Sixty 
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years later, on a matter related to race relations, the House of Lords was similarly restrictive 
in its view of the proper purposes for which government policy may be formulated. Leicester 
City Council banned the Leicester Rugby Club from using its recreation ground for the 
reason that some members of the rugby club participated in an unofficial tour of apartheid 
South Africa. A unanimous House of Lords struck down the Council’s decision, unswayed by 
the Council’s argument that it was duty-bound under the Race Relations Act 1976 to promote 
good race relations.
90
  
Yet, despite these early signs of resistance to the promotion of equality in the 
common law, the common law’s openness to progress is seen in the steady turn in recent 
decades towards a broader embrace of modern progressive public values.
91
 In a decision that 
confronted both legacies of common law and colonialism, the High Court of Australia 
updated the common law to take account of ‘contemporary notions of justice and human 
rights’. In Mabo v Queensland (No 2) the High Court rejected the common law doctrine that 
Australia was terra nullius prior to settlement by Europeans- a doctrine described as ‘frozen 
in an age of racial discrimination’- and thereby recognised the native title of indigenous 
populations of Australia.
92
 Steps have also been taken in the UK where in R v Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal, ex p Begum,
93
 a requirement in immigration rules that a dependent relative 
applying for admission to the UK must have a standard of living substantially below that of 
her own country was held to be ultra vires, as it would ‘automatically disqualify from 
admission […] virtually all those from the poorer countries of the world, irrespective of 
whatever exceptional compassionate circumstances may surround their case, and yet allow 
most dependants from the more affluent countries to be considered on general compassionate 
grounds.’  
Beyond critique of specific applications of the common law, there is a longstanding 
complaint that the procedural roots of the common law seem to betray a preoccupation with 
procedure rather than substance. Allied with the emphasis on procedure was a rather residual 
and remedial focus, particularly with respect to rights. So, historically, ‘common law was not 
a substantive law at all’94 and was ‘in essence procedural’.95 However, the procedural 
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emphasis and expertise of the common law is actually shown to be a strength when 
marshalled to advance and develop norms such as protections of access to court, fair 
procedure or natural justice. The Privy Council in Rees v Crane relied on common law 
procedural protections to find that a judge had been entitled to be heard in the preliminary 
proceedings that precipitated his suspension. Failure to grant the judge an opportunity to 
reply to allegations against him constituted a violation of the principles of natural justice and 
the right to fair hearing under section 4(b) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.
96
 In 
the Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court case the UK House of Lords was able to find that the 
appellant’s removal from South Africa to the United Kingdom was unlawful through the 
doctrine of abuse of process.
97
 Most recently, in Osborn v Parole Board, Lord Reed observed 
that the right to protection of the law, as guaranteed in article 6 of the ECHR, ‘is fulfilled 
primarily through detailed rules and principles to be found in several areas of domestic law, 
including the law of evidence and procedure, administrative law, and the law relating to legal 
aid.’98  
The central attributes of the common law therefore provide a combination of 
flexibility and stability which is crucial to constitutional sustenance. In balancing a reliance 
on precedent and responsiveness to evolving conceptions of the public good, the common law 
provides a basis for the necessary sustained relevance of a constitution. Moreover, the 
common law’s development reveals receptiveness to foreign influences as well as a capacity 
for broad dissemination, and consequently, for cosmopolitan relevance. The following 
section of the article will provide specific examples of the common law constitution as an 
instance of bounded cosmopolitanism. 
SIGNS OF COSMOPOLITAN COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
The cosmopolitan common law constitution is comprised of constitutional norms and 
methodologies that have gained consensus among common law jurisdictions. Manifestations 
of a developing cosmopolitan common law constitution are to be found in both the 
substantive development of common law norms and the common law affiliated 
methodological techniques utilised to develop the constitutional project in common law 
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states. It is the combined effect of substance and methodology that presents a meaningful 
picture of cosmopolitan common law constitutionalism. Emphasis on substance to the 
exclusion of the impact of shared methodology would be misleading and undermine the 
salience of the discourse on both common law constitutionalism and cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. As discussed below, accepted norms and methods include common law 
rights such as due process and principles such as judicial independence, as well as 
interpretive presumptions such as the principle of legality. Recalling that cosmopolitan 
common law constitutionalism is a developing transnational conversation- not a complete 
system- there is no exhaustive list of constitutive norms and methods. The examples in this 
section are therefore representative, having achieved acceptance and repeated application 
across varying constitutional models in the common law world and revealing the 
constitutional and cosmopolitan capabilities of the common law.   
Substantive Law 
Courts in the common law world engage with each other in developing and applying rights 
and institutional norms existing under their respective constitutions, bills of rights or at 
common law. Undoubtedly, the relevance of the common law to both codified and uncodified 
constitutions is a prerequisite for its suitability to the cosmopolitan task. On this score 
common law norms are far from deficient as they speak to both constitutional formulations, 
enabling the construction of ‘the abstract clauses of a “written” constitution’ while ‘giv[ing] 
an “unwritten” constitution its principal legal content.’99 
The continuing constitutional significance of common law rights in the United 
Kingdom was affirmed in 2001 by the UK House of Lords in Daly, where the Bench put 
beyond doubt that common law rights survived the enactment and implementation of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the consequent enforcement of Convention rights in the UK.
100
 
Despite a period of relative dormancy and attendant rumours of the demise of common law 
rights, there are strong signals that they are again in the ascendancy.
101
 While the common 
law’s significance in states with codified constitutions is more subtle, it is nonetheless 
momentous. Indeed, common law constitutionalism has infused constitutional interpretation 
in such states, producing a more complex interaction between unwritten and written 
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constitutionalism than would immediately be assumed in states that had enacted formal 
constitutions.  Thus, in Thomas v Baptiste, on an appeal from Trinidad and Tobago, the Privy 
Council found that prisoners who had been sentenced to death had a common law right 
existing alongside the Constitution, to be allowed to complete a pending legal process 
‘without having it rendered nugatory by executive action’.102 Consequently, the applicants 
could not be executed until their pending petitions before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights had been determined.  
The continuing significance of common law constitutional norms is strongly 
represented in due process and fair hearing rights. Fair hearing and due process protections 
have evolved as part of a cluster of norms prescribing principles for institutional interaction 
as well as opportunities for citizens to contribute to the articulation and enforcement of the 
constitution. While guarantees of a right to fair hearing and due process have found 
expression in constitutional texts in some nations, in determining the content of such rights 
and their scope of application, judges have repeatedly sought guidance from the common 
law. In Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor
103
 – a Privy Council judgment on appeal from 
Singapore- Lord Diplock noted, in a passage that has been cited by subsequent Benches of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Caribbean Court of Justice, and the High 
Court of Australia,
104
 that: 
a Constitution founded on the Westminster model and particularly in that part of 
it that purports to assure to all individual citizens the continued enjoyment of 
fundamental liberties or rights, references to “law” in such contexts as “in 
accordance with law”, “equality before the law”, “protection of the law” and the 
like, in their Lordships' view, refer to a system of law which incorporates those 
fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the 
common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the 
commencement of the Constitution.
105
 
The potency encapsulated in what seems, superficially, to be a procedural protection should 
not be underestimated. Its potential has been demonstrated in its use to compel the executive 
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to allow a prisoner to make representations as part of the determination whether to exercise 
the prerogative of mercy,
106
 to reject evidence obtained by torture
107
 and to delay (and 
effectively prevent) executions.
108
 
 Among the remaining influential facets of common law in a transnational scope are 
fundamental principles such as the rule of law and judicial independence. The methodology of 
reference to unwritten norms is discussed in greater detail below but some attention to the 
normative influence of particular principles is merited. The rule of law- one of the pillars of 
Dicey’s classic description of the common law constitution- continues to resound, while its 
boundaries have been expanded far beyond Dicey’s conception. The principle has been 
characterised as an unstated assumption of the Australian Constitution and has generated a 
requirement for a ‘minimum provision of judicial review’. This unstated assumption was 
activated in Plaintiff S/157/2002 v Commonwealth where the High Court of Australia was 
called upon to interpret an expansive privative clause in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).  The 
High Court narrowed the applicability of the clause by reference to the Constitution and its 
implication of the rule of law. Specifically, the Court interpreted section 75(v) of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 1900, which confers on the High Court 
original jurisdiction to hear matters in which the remedies of mandamus, prohibition or 
injunction are sought against an officer of the Commonwealth, as entrenching a ‘minimum 
provision of judicial review’. The Court proceeded to find that this section ‘constitutes a 
textual reinforcement’ of the rule of law as an assumption of the Australian Constitution.109 
Consequently, the rule of law constrains attempts to limit judicial review of federal and 
administrative acts. A related idea of the rule of law was employed by Lady Hale in Cart v 
Upper Tribunal in determining the scope of judicial review for decisions of the Upper 
Tribunal which were not amenable to appeal under the Tribunals Act 2007 (UK). Declaring 
that the ‘real question […] is what level of independent scrutiny outside the tribunal structure 
is required by the rule of law’,110 the UK Supreme Court confirmed that judicial review was 
available and mapped the breadth of such review. 
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Methodology 
Procedure and judicial technique are so central to the common law tradition that an analysis 
of methodology is critical in appreciating the development of the common law as a 
transnational constitutional force.
111
 Judicial techniques and methodologies reveal continuity 
between judicial review prior and subsequent to bills of rights as well as kinship among 
jurisdictions with codified constitutions and those without.
112
 Among common law 
methodological techniques that merit consideration are the principle of legality and reasoning 
by unwritten principles.
113
 
Methodological commonality exists in the position taken by common law courts that 
legislatures enact statutes against a background of constitutional principles and rights, which 
‘places powerful constraints on what statutory language can be’.114 Analogous and 
interrelated features connect constitutional adjudication in the common law world, with 
courts applying similar techniques to interpret legislation against the background of 
constitutional norms. Lord Hoffmann’s contention in Simms of a near identity between the 
principle of legality and ‘principles of constitutionality […] which exist in countries where 
the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document’ was certainly 
overly complimentary of the common law and under-appreciative of the enforcement power 
granted to courts under written constitutions.
115
 Nonetheless, there is more than a kernel of 
truth in his oft-cited assertion.
116
     
Common to both the principle of legality and constitutional enforcement mechanisms 
are two important features. First, there is the presumption that legislation is to be interpreted 
consistently with the norms of the constitution unless it is impossible to do so.
117
 While the 
interpretative power consequent upon this presumption gives the appearance of judicial 
empowerment at the expense of legislative will, the constitutional implications of the 
presumption are more subtle. It embodies a balance of respect for legislative decision-making 
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and respect for the constitution as fundamental law. An aspect of this presumption is the idea 
that the legislature itself plays a role in upholding constitutional norms, and as such, does not 
generally intend to legislate in contravention of those norms. In states with codified 
constitutions (particularly those with justiciable bills of rights), the respect for the legislature 
is further heightened by the fact that rights consistent interpretation forestalls more aggressive 
corrective action on the part of the judiciary in the form of invalidation.
118
  
Second, both mechanisms preserve the possibility for legislative override of judicial 
interpretation and application of constitutional norms. For the principle of legality the 
legislative backstop is part and parcel of the principle itself. Thus, a clear express legislative 
statement indicating the intention to override a constitutional principle or fundamental right 
displaces the presumption of constitutional consistency. Consequently, the majority of the 
High Court of Australia in Al-Kateb v Godwin found the presumption to be unhelpful in 
interpreting sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that appeared to authorise the indefinite 
detention of a non-citizen who has entered Australia unlawfully. McHugh J opined that the 
provisions were ‘too clear to read them as being subject to a purposive limitation or an 
intention not to affect fundamental rights.’119 So also the House of Lords declined to read 
down a police stop and search power conferred in section 44 of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2000 in Gillan v Commission of Police. Beyond doubting whether a constitutional right 
was operative, the Law Lords found that even if the relevant sections were ‘accepted as 
infringing a fundamental human right, […] they do not do so by general words but by 
provisions of a detailed, specific and unambiguous character’, thus allowing no room for the 
application of the principle of legality.
120
  
Legislative override mechanisms exist in a variety of formulations ranging from 
notwithstanding clauses to ‘special acts’ to constitutional amendments. Canada’s 
‘notwithstanding clause’ enables Canadian legislatures to provide for the operation of 
legislation ‘notwithstanding’ the inconsistency of such legislation with provisions of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
121
 The availability of legislative override is a 
feature of what is often referred to as the dialogue model of constitutional law or more 
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recently, the ‘new commonwealth model of constitutionalism’.122 However, override 
mechanisms are also featured in older constitutional models in the form of ‘Special Acts’, for 
instance. The Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago provides an example; under section 13, 
Parliament may enact legislation that expressly declares that the statute shall have effect 
regardless of its inconsistency with the constitution’s rights guarantees so long as it is 
supported by at least a three-fifths majority of each Chamber.
123
 Ultimately, some 
constitutional designs permit room for override in the form of constitutional amendment, a 
feat which has been accomplished in several jurisdictions, including Barbados, which 
overrode judicial interpretations of the constitutional right to freedom from inhuman and 
degrading treatment.
124
  
Further methodological commonality exists in the enduring technique of referring to 
unwritten principles in the interpretation of constitutional instruments. Such principles 
contribute historical evidence, comparative insights and broader constitutional context for the 
constitutional text at issue. Principles that have been so engaged include judicial 
independence, the rule of law, separation of powers, democracy and equality.
125
 The 
separation of powers is a useful exemplar, with both the Privy Council and House of Lords 
invoking the principle in interpretation of codified constitutions and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The principle was described by Lord Phillips in a 2011 
judgment as having ‘progressively become part of the, largely unwritten, constitution of the 
United Kingdom’,126 and has been repeatedly characterised as ‘entrenched in the so-called 
Westminster model of written constitutions.’127 The Caribbean Court of Justice 
contextualised the separation of powers in a written constitutional framework in Attorney 
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General v Zuniga on appeal from Belize, stating that ‘in the post-independence Anglophone 
Caribbean the doctrine of the separation of powers derives its force from the fact that the 
fundamental law upon which the legal order rests, i.e. the Constitution, disperses the power of 
the sovereign State among various branches’ and further argued: ‘Application of the 
separation of powers doctrine upholds the Constitution, advances the rule of law and 
promotes the description of Belize as “a sovereign democratic state”.’128 Through this 
interpretative technique, the separation of powers has underpinned judicial independence, 
natural justice and equality before the law, and has assisted in shaping and articulating the 
court’s role in the application of constitutions and bills of rights.129 
An exclusive focus on substantive law without heed to the impact of common law 
methodology in shaping judicial approaches to bills of rights and constitutions would produce 
a flawed and anaemic understanding of the role of the common law in transnational 
constitutionalism. Thus, an account either in support of, or opposition to, the continuing 
import of common law rights, must not only address the range and substance of common law 
rights.
130
 Such accounts must also acknowledge the importance of methodology developed 
under the common law, which continues to affect judicial interpretation across a spectrum of 
common law countries. It is often the connector of methodology that links jurisdictions of 
differing constitutional frameworks within the common law family. 
CONCLUSION 
The cosmopolitan impulse, then, can be useful in accounting for and developing our 
articulation of transnational legal interactions. The danger emerges when that impulse results 
in accounts of globalised law that are unrestrained by the current state of transnational legal 
conversations. Bounded cosmopolitanism offers a novel and modest framework for both 
marshalling and restraining the cosmopolitan impulse, allowing for more realistic accounts of 
legal orders that extend beyond the state but are nonetheless tethered by meaningful 
acknowledgment of compartmentalisation. The emergence of a cosmopolitan common law 
constitution presents one model of bounded cosmopolitanism, evidencing an interplay 
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between the convergent currents of common law method and fundamental principles with the 
divergent influence of particularities of local constitutional design.  
The breadth of influence of the common law in constitutional development across 
temporal and spatial divides is largely a function of its ubiquity, in that every statute ‘is 
mediated to the people by the common law.’131 In both jurisdictions with uncodified 
constitutional arrangements and states operating within a codified constitutional model, the 
common law acts as a ‘unifying principle’, furnishing tools to construe legislation and a 
framework to make sense of constitutional changes and resolve disputes between institutions 
of state and between the individual and the state. Evolution and adaptability are pivotal to the 
transnational relevance of any constitutional source or framework and the common law 
continues to function in this regard as an instrument that enables institutions to understand 
and contextualize legal –especially constitutional- changes as well as the socio-political 
transformations that result from, and contribute to, the interconnectedness of law and society 
today. Thus, ‘the strength of the common law does not lie in its conformity but in its ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances.’132  
While this article has focused on making the case for the existence of cosmopolitan 
common law constitutionalism, the framework for this model- bounded cosmopolitanism- has 
greater resonance and can be adopted to frame analysis of further transnational orders. The 
bounded cosmopolitan framework can provide a foothold for further research on 
transnational legal orders, and on the continuing attempt of transnational lawyers to reconcile 
cosmopolitanism and heterogeneity. Moreover, this proposal seeks to further engagement 
with theories that emphasise the move beyond the state; it seeks to confirm and embrace this 
direction of the law while cautioning that meaningful cosmopolitanism in law ought to be 
plurality-sensitive, recognising harmonisation and assimilation alongside difference and 
diversity.   
 
                                                 
131
  Laws, Common Law Constitution supra note 71 at 6. 
132
 Örücü, E (1999) Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition 
Deventer, Kluwer Law International at para 5.2. 
